Which of the following is NOT the background information of a possible attack on

W: Welcome to News Analysis. (1) Just ahead of the visit to the United States by Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel Some speculate that Israel is ever more likely to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Here with me is Steven, correspondent from The Economist. Good evening, welcome. Can you first tell us more background information. Why the bombing? Why now?
M: Well, stand-off between Iran and western countries has existed for quite a long time. It looks as if it is about to fail. Iran has continued enriching uranium. It is acquiring the technology it needs for a weapon. Deep underground, at Fordow, near the holy city of Qom, it is fitting out a uranium-enrichment plant that many say is invulnerable to aerial attack. Iran does not yet seem to have chosen actually to procure a nuclear arsenal, but that moment could come soon. Some analysts, especially in Israel, judge that the scope for using force is running out. When it does, nothing will stand between Iran and a bomb.
W: So they decide an attack might be the best solution.
M: Yes, the air is thick with the prophecy of war. Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, has spoken of Israel attacking as early as April. (2) Others foresee an Israeli strike designed to drag in Barack Obama in the run-up to America’s presidential vote, when he will have most to lose from seeming weak.
W: In your opinion, is the attack justified and if so should they carry it out?
M: A decision to go to war should be based on the argument that war is warranted and likely to succeed. Iran’s intentions are malign and the consequences of its having a weapon would be grave. Faced by such a regime you should never permanently forswear war. However, the case for war’s success is hard to make. If Iran is intent on getting a bomb, an attack would delay but not stop it. (3) Using Western bombs as a tool to prevent nuclear proliferation risks making Iran only more determined to build a weapon and more dangerous when it gets one.
W: Then you’re arguing against that. But isn’t a nuclear Iran something not acceptable?
M: I don’t deny that. Even if Iran were to gain a weapon only for its own protection, others in the region might then feel they need weapons too. Saudi Arabia has said it will arm— and Pakistan is thought ready to supply a bomb in exchange for earlier Saudi backing of its own programme. Turkey and Egypt, the other regional powers, might conclude they have to join the nuclear club. Elsewhere, countries such as Brazil might see nuclear arms as vital to regional dominance, or fear that their neighbours will. But military action is not the solution to a nuclear Iran. It could retaliate, including with rocket attacks on Israel from its client groups in Lebanon and Gaza. Terror cells around the world might strike Jewish and American targets. It might threaten Arab oil infrastructure, in an attempt to use oil prices to wreck the world economy. Although some Arab leaders back a strike, most Muslims are unlikely to feel that way, further alienating the West from the Arab spring. Such costs of an attack are easy to overstate, but even supposing they were high they might be worth paying if a strike looked like working. It does not.
W: Some experts say that if it can succeed, then the benefits outdo the negatives.
M: Predictions of the damage from an attack span a huge range. At worst an Israeli mission might fail altogether, at best an American one could, it is said, set back the programme a decade. But uncertainty would reign. Iran is a vast, populous and sophisticated country with a nuclear programme that began under the shah. It may have secret sites that escape unscathed. (4) Even if all its sites are hit, Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be bombed out of existence.
W: Perhaps America could bomb Iran every few years? Is it a possible solution?
M: But how would it know when and where to strike? And how would it justify a failing policy to the world?
W: What about a war, or even a regime change? Can it help?
M: No. A decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated where that leads. An aerial war could dramatically raise the threat of retaliation. Regime change might produce a government that the West could do business with. But the nuclear program has broad support in Iran. The idea that a bomb is the only defense against an implacable American enemy might become stronger than ever.
W: If all those actions are ruled out, isn’t it the case that Iran will simply get the bomb?
M: It doesn’t have to be The government will soon be starved of revenues, because of an oil embargo. Sanctions are biting, the financial system is increasingly isolated and the currency has plunged in value. The regime in Tehran is divided and it has lost the faith of its people. Eventually, popular resistance will spring up as it did in 2009. (5) A new regime brought about by the Iranians themselves is more likely to renounce the bomb than one that has just witnessed an American assault.
W: All right. Thank you for being here and sharing with us your opinion.