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  3. Turning Brownfields into Greenbacks Inactive industrial si

Turning Brownfields into Greenbacks Inactive industrial si

游客2024-02-16  17
问题                   Turning Brownfields into Greenbacks
    Inactive industrial sites are transforming into productive facilities.
    Brownfields are industrial sites whose future use is restricted because of real or perceived pollution. The number of brownfield sites tins grown exponentially during the, past 25 years. The growth curve has reached epidemic proportions-as many as 650,000 brownfield sites exist in the United States today.
    Both the public and private sectors realize the problem cannot continue to grow unchecked.
    More of the impetus for redevelopment comes from state and local governments, which is not surprising since the brownfield epidemic directly affects thousands of U.S. communities. Many of these impacts are so serious that they threaten fiscal and social health of communities. Brownfield sites frequently result in a decreased tax base, urban blight, loss of infrastructure, suburban sprawl, the depletion of farmland and a loss of employment opportunities. State and local governments are more directly affected by these problems than their federal counterpart.
    Although the impact is felt most strongly at the state and local levels, federal legislation is largely responsible for the brownfield phenomenon. In particular, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act’s (CERCLA) onerous (繁重的) provisions have induced thousands of property owners, lenders and prospective purchasers to shun industrial property.
    Theoretically, various provisions allow owners and lenders to avoid liability. Unfortunately, two of the primary ways to avoid liability are fraught with difficulty. Both the innocent landowner defence and the security interest exemption (免除) contain ambiguous language that is troubling to the members of the regulated community they were designed to protect.
The ambiguity, coupled with CERCLA’s draconian liability scheme, has created a vacuum. Existing owners, prospective purchasers and lenders have become alert to industrial properties. Hundreds of thousands of moderately troubled properties sit idle because of the threat of CERCLA liability. These sites constitute the nation’s approximately 650,000 brownfields. Until recently, prospective purchasers, lenders and tenants have had no reason to risk CERCLA liability by becoming involved in brownfield sites-but things are beginning to change. Federal and state governments have taken steps to encourage private parties to revitalize brownfields. An important plank in both federal and state programmes are provisions that limit owner and lender liability.
Federal Initiatives
    The federal government has revised its policy on prospective purchaser agreements—contracts  between the EPA and buyers of contaminated sites. The EPA originally published its Prospective Purchaser Guidance in 1989. At that time its policy was to avoid entanglements in what it viewed as private real estate deals. Since then, the number of inactive industrial sites has increased dramatically. State and local governments across the country complained loudly about the impact the sites were having on the economic and social health of their communities. The EPA now makes it easier for prospective purchasers to quantify their cleanup obligations by executing a prospective purchaser agreement.
    Other important initiatives included in EPA’s Brownfield Action Agenda were the Underground  Storage Tank Lender Liability Rule and Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers Guidance.
State Initiatives
    Many states have enacted Voluntary Cleanup Programmes (VCPs), designed to encourage the reuse of dormant industrial sites. Most VCPs offer mechanisms that limit owner liability for those not contributing to the sites’ environmental problems.
    Some VCPs allow regulators to enter into covenants not to sue, which provides owners with the ability to quantify their environmental obligations to regulators.
    The state EPA agrees not to sue the owner/covenantee as long as it performs the cleanup which it agrees to. Without a cap on liability, investors steer clear of brownfield sites.
    Cleanup Financing
    Legislators and regulators have provided a variety of mechanisms to limit tile liability of those contemplating purchasing, leasing or lending money on brownfield properties. The problem is that the parties remain alert to brownfield sites. Their attitudes are based on sound logic.
    Greenfields are properties not previously used or despite previous use that have no real or perceived contamination. Prospective brownfield developers are aware that they can avoid the complications inherent in a brownfield acquisition by acquiring greenfields.
    Private industry typically will only consider brownfield deals that offer exceptional upside potential.
    To date, the most important breakthroughs in brownfields have been the liability limitations.
    Unfortunately, these provisions merely put the owner or lender in the same position they would be in with a greenfield development. These parties are also keenly aware that they will have to spend large amounts of money on legal, engineering and other professional help to get to the same place.
    Why should a developer or corporation spend time and money on a brownfield redevelopment?
    In some instances, brownfield properties offer exceptional investment opportunities. Many brownfields are available at a steep discount largely attributable to "stigma equity". Stigma equity is created when the sale price and the cleanup cost are less than the uncontaminated value of the site.
    Finance is becoming more important in the environmental field, largely due to the decrease in enforcement actions. Environmental agencies across the United States are under budgetary pressures. Until recently, many remediation projects were undertaken solely because of the command and control system, meaning ’~you do or else". The fines and penalties contained in various environmental statutes and regulations were sufficiently punitive to coerce action by a significant percentage of the regulated community. Recently, legislators and regulators have been leaning away from the command and control model. They recognize there is simply not enough manpower to rely exclusively on the paradigm.
    Incentives have been introduced to encourage companies to voluntarily take environmentally friendly actions. In particular, brownfields are now the focus of legislative and regulatory initiatives designed to spur private industry to clean up the environment.
Potential Market
    Brownfield redevelopment constitutes one of the largest potential markets for environmental vendors (卖主). Environmental vendors must help their clients pay for remediation costs. Firms that help clients generate cash flow will be more successful than other technically competent organizations  that choose to ignore the issue.
    Environmental vendors can ally themselves with organizations offering brownfield financing.
These relationships can work both ways the financing firms frequently come across cleanup projects that require a broad array of expertise. Consequently, they may be able to reciprocate (回报).
Voluntary Cleanup Programmes
    Many states have enacted voluntary cleanup programmes with a wide array of provisions, including finds to investigate and remedy brownfields, and stale money for prospective purchasers to investigate the environmental condition of a property.
    This type of funding is important because it provides investors with strong motivalion to investigate sites that were previously thought to harbour significant levels of pollution.
    Once a prospective purchaser discovers that a site is relatively clean, the deal is much more likely to proceed. Many salvageable sites would lay fallow (休耕的) without this state funding. [br] The state EPA insists on suing the owner even if it agrees to perform the cleanup.
选项 A、Y
B、N
C、NG
答案 B
解析
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