2. 职称英语
  3. Passage Three (1) While lots of attention is directed toward identifyin

Passage Three (1) While lots of attention is directed toward identifyin

游客2023-11-24  22
问题     Passage Three
    (1)  While lots of attention is directed toward identifying the next great start-up, the defining tech-industry story of the last decade has been the rise of Apple and Google. In terms of wealth creation, there is no comparison. Eight years ago, neither one of them was even in the top 10 most valuable companies in the world, and their combined market value was less than $300 billion. Now, Apple and Alphabet (Google’s parent company) have become the two most valuable companies,  with a combined market capitalization of over
    $1.3 trillion.   And  increasingly,   these  two behemoths  are  starting  to  collide  in  various  markets,   from smartphones to home-audio devices to, according to speculation, automobiles.
    (2)   But the greatest collision between Apple and Google is little noticed. The companies have taken completely different approaches to their shareholders and to the future, one willing to accede to the demands of investors and the other keeping power in the hands of founders and executives. These rival approaches are about something much bigger than just two of the most important companies in the world; they embody two alternative models of capitalism, and the one that wins out will shape the future of the economy.
    (3)  The paths taken by Apple and Google manifest alternative answers to one of the main questions facing capitalism today: What should public companies do with all of the money that they’re making? Even as corporations have brought in enormous profits, there has been a shortage of lucrative opportunities for investment and growth, creating surpluses of cash. This imbalance has resulted in the pileup of $2 trillion on corporate balance sheets. As companies continue to generate more profits than they need to fund their own growth, the question becomes: Who will decide what to do with all those profits—managers or investors? At Google, where the founders and executives reign supreme, insulated by their governance structure, the answer is the former. At Apple, where the investors are in charge because of the absence of one large manager-shareholder, it’s the latter.
    (4)  Why has each company taken the approach that it has? These two strategies reflect different reactions to an issue central to modern capitalism, the separation of ownership and control. In short, owners aren’t managers, as they once were when businesses existed on a smaller scale. And when owners have to outsource running the company to executives, this leads to what economists call " the principal-agent problem" , which refers to the issues that come up when one person, group, or company—an "agent"—can make decisions that significantly affect another—a "principal".
    (5)  Having investors dominate, as Apple does, is a good way of handling one principal-agent problem; getting managers to do right by their owners. Rather than spending money on failed products or managers’ pet projects, Apple has to face the disciplining force of large investors. In a way that individual shareholders would have trouble doing, larger investors can act swiftly to put a check on managers who might pursue goals that enrich themselves, such as wasteful mergers, or excessive executive compensation. And, after all, a company’s profits theoretically belong to investors, so why shouldn’t they decide how they are put to use?
    (6)   Proponents of the managerial model embodied by Google worry about a different principal-agent problem. Rather than being concerned about managers ignoring investors, they are concerned that investors won’t serve the people who would benefit from the long-term success of the company. Those professional investors are both the principals for the CEOs but also the agents of many other shareholders. The hedge funds that pressured Apple are the dreaded "short-term" investors who are interested only in quick wins and don’t serve their longer-term beneficiaries, such as pension funds, that allocate capital to them in the first place.   As investors, hedge funds are impatient, and, the argument goes, ruining the economy by shortening time horizons.
    (7)  Who’s right? Which principal-agent problem is more vexing? Stock-market returns are one, albeit imperfect, way of answering this question and since the initial developments, Google has far outperformed Apple. But that pattern is flipped if the time frame is restricted to the past year. So it won’t be known for many years to come if Apple or Google has a sharper financial strategy.
    (8)  More importantly, though, how do these strategies impact the lives of everyday people? A capitalist system aims for the efficient allocation of capital, and indeed, workers have a better shot at seeing median wages increase when money is being put to its most productive use. So to an extent, how they fare under each system has to do with who is deciding where and how profits get invested. When managers reallocate profits, that reallocation benefits from the capabilities and knowledge that companies have built over decades, but suffers from the possibly poor incentives of managers. When investors are the ones reallocating profits, however, the scope of the reallocation can be broader, theoretically leading to more innovation; at the same time, those investors don’t have preexisting organizational capabilities and they may suffer from their own short-term time horizons.
    (9)  Even if one considers the disparities in the shares of wealth accruing to labor and capital problematic— and there certainly are other strategies for addressing those disparities—making sure that managers and investors are dividing their responsibilities on capital allocation efficiently is critical for making the economic pie as big as it can be. And in that regard, while the problems of Google’s model are significant, they are also well appreciated. The excesses of Apple’s model and the widespread deployment of share buybacks are just as dangerous—and not nearly as well understood.
    (10)  So which model of capitalism will win out? The dominant corporate-finance pattern for the last decade has been Apple’s. Companies have been distributing cash via share buybacks and have borrowed money to finance these distributions at a rapid rate. As American stalwarts such as Deere, IBM, Amgen, and 3M cede power to investors, it’s like watching leveraged buyouts unfold in slow motion.
    (11)  The importance of these two models might soon escalate dramatically. There’s a real possibility that tax reform at the federal level will unlock the offshore cash that corporations have amassed, and the subsequent flood of money will have to be reallocated in the economy—somewhere, somehow.    [br] About "the principal-agent problem" , which of the following statements is CORRECT?
选项 A、It is a vital problem of the capitalism economy.
B、It reflects the divergence of interests of two sides.
C、It can be better solved when investors dominate.
D、It is implacable at the separation of ownership and control.
答案 B
解析 细节题。根据题干定位至第四段。该段最后一句解释了所谓“委托代理问题”的具体含义，即一个人、一个组织或公司，即“代理人”可以做出对“企业负责人”产生重大影响的决定时产生的问题，也即代理方做出的决定能够影响“委托方”时产生的问题，而第五段和第六段分别介绍了苹果和谷歌两个公司处理这一关系的不同方式，显示出委托方和代理方是有利益分歧的，故[B]为答案。作者在第四段第二句提到了对委托代理问题的不同处理策略显示了对现代资本主义核心问题的不同反应，但并未说这个问题是资本主义的致命问题，因此排除[A]；作者虽然在第五段和第六段分别介绍了对委托代理问题不同的处理策略，但是并没有评价优劣，因此排除[C]“当投资方主导时能更好地解决这个问题”；文章相关段落探讨了委托代理问题的应对策略，但并没有说这个问题是否不可调和，故排除[D]“只要所有权和控制权分离，这个问题就不可调和”。
转载请注明原文地址:https://tihaiku.com/zcyy/3215386.html
相关试题推荐
随机试题
最新回复(0)